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Abstract
We use a Fama-French based approach to investigate the risk-adjusted performance of five
regionally diverse sets of SRI indices and their conventional benchmarks from 1997 to 2014.
In accordance with most previous research, we find that SRI indices perform on par with
their benchmarks in the long run. However, we postulate that SRI screening leads to in-
creased idiosyncratic risk and that this will translate into inferior risk-adjusted returns in
periods of falling markets. Expanding on the Fama-French approach with dummy variables
for the Dotcom Fall in the early 2000s and the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009, as well as
adjusting for variations in the market, size and value premiums in these periods, we find that
SRI underperforms in periods of falling markets. As a result, we argue that socially respon-
sible investors with a long investment horizon should not expect inferior financial returns,
but investors with a shorter investment horizon should be wary of SRI.
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1 Introduction
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) works by incorporating non-financial information,
such as the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) behavior of companies, into the
investment decision. A social responsible investor can avoid firms or industries involved
in ethically questionable activities, or he can take a more proactive approach and seek out
firms or industries with impeccable ethical records. Either way, this reduces the available
investment universe, which modern portfolio theory says will lead to increased idiosyn-
cratic risk and less efficient portfolios (Humphrey and Tan 2014). It is a stylized fact of
finance that investors in efficient capital markets do not receive compensation for taking on
idiosyncratic risk, which implies that SRI should underperform conventional investments
on a risk-adjusted basis. However, supporters of SRI argue that the benefits of integrating
ESG considerations into the portfolio creation process exceed the loss in efficiency caused
by the reduced investment universe (RBC 2012). Most research on SRI performance fail
to reject the null hypothesis that SRI performs on par with conventional investments in the
long run, supporting neither of these arguments (Kurtz and DiBartolomeo 2011, Boon et al.
2013, Humphrey and Tan 2014). For long-term investors, this might provide a satisfactory
answer regarding the performance of SRI versus conventional investing. On the other hand,
investors with a shorter investment horizon might shun SRI if it leads to an inferior risk-
adjusted return in the short term. Considering the reduced diversification suggested above,
this seems entirely plausible. If SRI delivers an inferior risk-adjusted return in the short
term, we suspect that this will become apparent in times of falling markets, when having
a well-diversified portfolio is crucial. Therefore, this study investigate both the long-term
risk-adjusted return of SRI and the short-term performance in periods of falling markets.
Most research on SRI performance investigate SRI funds, but this introduces distorting ef-
fects such as market timing, manager skill and management fees (RBC 2012). Instead, this
study expands on previous research by Gjølberg and Johnsen (2008) on the risk-adjusted
performance of SRI indices. We investigate five regionally diverse sets of SRI indices and
their benchmarks over an 18-year period from 1997 to 2014. Through a Fama-French three-
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factor model, we account for differences in systematic risk factors between the SRI indices
and their benchmarks, specifically the tendency of SRI to tilt towards large growth stocks
(Boon et al. 2013, Renneboog et al. 2008, Gjølberg and Johnsen 2008). To measure the
SRI performance in periods of falling markets, we expand on the Fama-French three-factor
model with dummy variables for the Dotcom Fall in the early 2000s and the Financial Crisis
of 2007 to 2009. Furthermore, to adjust for the large variations in the market, size and value
premiums in these periods, we include interaction terms between the dummy variables and
the Fama-French risk factors.
In accordance with most previous research, the results show no significant difference in the
performance of the SRI indices and their benchmarks over the full sample period. This im-
plies that SRI might be a suitable investment option for investors with an infinite investment
horizon, such as pension funds and university endowment funds. However, the results indi-
cate substantial financial losses from investing in the SRI indices instead of their benchmarks
in both periods of falling markets. For example, FTSE4Good US, a well-known SRI index,
deliver an inferior risk-adjusted return compared to its benchmark of -6.59 %-points p.a.
during the Financial Crisis. This inferior risk-adjusted return in periods of falling markets
should make investors with a shorter investment horizon wary of SRI.
We organize the remainder of this study as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the
SRI industry today and its different approaches, while section 3 discusses theory. Section 4
reviews related literature, section 5 describes the data used and section 6 presents descriptive
statistics. Section 7 introduces the models, while section 8 presents the results. Section 9
provides a discussion of those results and section 10 concludes.
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2 Socially Responsible Investing
SRI has many definitions, but we define it as investments that are limited to some degree
by environmental, social or governance criteria. This definition is consistent with that of
Schro¨der (2007) and Renneboog et al. (2008). SRI is tightly related to Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) and can be seen as a component of CSR overall. The EU Commission
(2011) define CSR as ”companies taking responsibility for their impact on society”.
2.1 The SRI Industry
SRI is a fast growing industry, especially in the U.S. and Europe. At the end of 2014, $6.57
trillion were managed using SRI strategies in the U.S.. This equals one out of every six dol-
lars under professional management and is an increase of 76 % from $3.74 trillion in 2012.
In Europe, the total size of the SRI industry is larger than in the U.S., but the growth rate is
lower. e9.9 trillion of assets were managed with SRI strategies in 2013, which is an increase
of 22 % from 2011 (EUROSIF 2015). The increased popularity of SRI has translated into a
large growth of investor services trying to meet this demand. For example, U.S. SRI funds
have grown from $12 billion and 55 funds in 1995 to $4.3 trillion and 925 funds in 2014
(USSIF 2014). Furthermore, index producers like FTSE and MSCI have designed a wide
range of indices with different SRI strategies, while companies like Ethics and EIRIS have
specialized in research and advisory services on SRI. In addition, established assurance and
advisory firms, such as EY and PwC have started their own departments for advisory within
climate, sustainability and social responsibility.
2.2 Classification of SRI approaches
European Sustainability Investment Forum (Eurosif) presents seven distinct strategies for
socially responsible investing: exclusions, norms-based screening, best-in-class selection,
sustainability themed, ESG integration, engagement and impact investing (EUROSIF 2015).
We group these investment strategies into three main bodies, namely Negative screening,
Positive screening and Engagement.
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2.2.1 Negative screening
With negative screening, the investor excludes certain industries or firms in which he does
not wish to be involved. This strategy has gone mainstream and now covers more assets
than any other SRI approach. In Europe alone, exclusions cover about 41 % of profes-
sionally managed assets, with the most common exclusions covering cluster munition and
anti-personnel landmines (EUROSIF 2015). Norms-based screening is another type of neg-
ative screening, which involves applying an ESG-filter to the portfolio manager’s investment
universe. These filters are created by index management firms or ethical advisory firms, and
they are often based on international norms such as the United Nations Global Compact or
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and International Treaties (EUROSIF
2015).
2.2.2 Positive screening
Positive screening is an umbrella term covering many different SRI strategies. However, all
the strategies have in common that they seek out firms with a proactive approach to ESG
issues. Best-in-class selection involves investing in the best companies in an industry ac-
cording to ESG criteria. ESG integration involves a systematic approach of including ESG
risks and opportunities into the financial analysis and investment decisions. Sustainability
themed investing are typically direct investments into industries transitioning into more sus-
tainable forms of production and energy consumption, while impact investing includes a
social goal in addition to a financial goal. For example, microfinance is an impact invest-
ing method that attempts to further social integration while creating competitive financial
returns.
2.2.3 Engagement
Engagement involves taking on the role of active ownership, either by using shareholder
votes or through communication with the company, to improve the environmental, social or
governance aspect of the company. On the index level, it revolves around providing firms
that fall beneath a certain threshold on ESG criteria with a warning before excluding them,
making it possible for these firms to correct their behavior (FTSE 2014c).
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3 Theory
3.1 Why investigate market-level data
There is an extensive literature attempting to clarify the relationship between corporate so-
cial performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) on the firm level. Sup-
porters of a positive relationship typically use stakeholder theory to argue that firms engag-
ing in ESG activities outperform their competitors (RBC 2012). Proponents of a negative
relationship, most famously Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman, argues that corporate ex-
ecutives’ only responsibility is to their shareholders and that CSR practices goes against this
(Friedman 1970). When it comes to studying CSP and its effect on CFP at the firm level,
problems of determining the direction of causality arises. Does good corporate social be-
havior lead to good financial performance or does good financial performance simply allow
a firm to engage in social practices? This field of study has largely produced inconclusive
results. An extensive meta study by Margolis et al. (2007) investigate 167 CSP/CFP studies
only to find a weak positive correlation. They conclude that further studies of CSP/CFP at
the firm level is of little use and discourage further effort into this area. A more worthwhile
approach may be to investigate market-level data.
3.2 Index approach
The most widely used approach for investigating SRI performance through market-level data
is to compare the performance of SRI funds to conventional funds. However, investigating
fund performance introduces distorting effects such as market timing, management skills
and transaction costs. Furthermore, fund data often suffers from survivorship bias (Carhart
1997) and presents a problem of finding matching funds to use as benchmarks (Boon et al.
2013). To avoid these problems, we prefer to investigate the performance of SRI indices
instead. For example, most SRI indices are screened versions of conventional indices, cir-
cumventing the problem of finding an appropriate benchmark. However, investigating the
performance of SRI indices versus their benchmarks is not problem free. For instance, style
differences between the SRI indices and their conventional benchmarks, such as different
Bredal & Nega˚rd
6 3 THEORY
loadings on the size and the value factor, will have to be adjusted for (Gjølberg and Johnsen
2008, RBC 2012).
3.3 Implications of SRI screening in portfolio management
3.3.1 Underperformance hypothesis - ”Doing good, but not well”
Imposing a negative screen on a portfolio reduces the available investment universe. Further-
more, if this negative screen affects different industries unevenly, this might lead to skewed
sector weights. Proponents of the underperformance hypothesis advocate that reducing the
investment universe and changing the sector tilts will impede the portfolio manager’s ability
to form fully diversified portfolios. This may result in portfolios with increased idiosyncratic
risk. In efficient capital markets, investors do not receive higher return as compensation
for taking on idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, modern portfolio theory suggests that impos-
ing negative screens should lead to less efficient portfolios with lower risk-adjusted returns
(Humphrey and Tan 2014). Additionally, if ESG factors are negatively related to financial
performance, then screening for these factors may cause the portfolio to underperform. For
example, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) study the performance of publicly traded companies
involved in tobacco, gaming and alcohol, so called ”sin” stocks, and find that these consis-
tently outperform comparable stocks. They attribute this outperformance to sin stocks being
less followed by Wall Street analysts and less held by norm-constrained institutions, such as
pension funds.
3.3.2 Outperformance hypothesis - ”Doing well by doing good”
Supporters of SRI argue that the benefits of integrating ESG considerations into the portfolio
creation process outweighs the loss of portfolio efficiency caused by the reduced investment
universe. They maintain that companies excluded by SRI screening are involved in unsus-
tainable activities that makes them less profitable over time. For example, heavy polluters
are more likely to face litigation (RBC 2012). If market participants systematically underes-
timate the benefits or overestimate the costs of being socially responsible, then the expected
return of socially responsible companies might be consistently higher (RBC 2012, Statman
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and Glushkov 2009). This is consistent with the findings of Edmans (2011) who shows
that firms with greater employment practices consistently deliver superior earnings perfor-
mance, but that the market undervalues these intangibles. Furthermore, Derwall et al. (2005)
show that companies with high environmental records outperform comparable stocks. It is
also in agreement with Kempf and Osthoff (2007) who finds that stocks of firms ranking
high on human rights, employee relations, environment, community, diversity and products
outperform low ranking stocks.
3.4 Long-term versus short-term SRI performance
Many of the arguments in favor of the outperformance hypothesis, for example the findings
of Edmans (2011) on the systematic failure of the market to value intangibles, are likely
to require some time to manifest into positive excess returns. This suggests that we should
investigate a long sample period. For institutional investors, such as pension funds, who
are mostly interested in potential portfolio shortfall far into the future, investigating a long
sample period might provide a satisfactory answer regarding the performance of SRI ver-
sus conventional investments. Contrary, private investors might shun investing in SRI if the
short-term negative fluctuations are larger than for conventional investments. This may also
be the case for institutional investors under governmental control. For example, the Nor-
wegian Government Pension Fund Global is under heavy public scrutiny, and short-term
underperformance tend to produce newspaper headlines and political dismay. If the under-
performance hypothesis is correct, and the reduced investment universe and changed sector
tilts lead to a substantial increase in the idiosyncratic risk, then this is likely to become ap-
parent in times of crisis, when having a diversified portfolio is of the utmost importance.
To accommodate the interests of both types of investors, this study tests the effects of SRI
screening over a long holding period and during periods of drastically falling stock markets.
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4 Literature review
Renneboog et al. (2008) builds on their previous research (Renneboog et al. 2007) and inves-
tigate the performance of SRI funds from 17 countries. They find that SRI funds in the U.S.,
U.K. and in many European and Asia-Pacific countries underperform their benchmarks by
-2.2 % to -6.5 % p.a. However, when risk is taken into consideration through a four-factor
model, they do not find any statistical evidence that the returns of SRI funds differ from
that of conventional ones. Furthermore, they investigate whether increasing the SRI screen-
ing intensity enhances fund performance. They find that funds with one additional screen
are associated with 1 % p.a. lower factor-adjusted return, and conclude that high screening
intensity constrains the risk-return optimization.
Kurtz and DiBartolomeo (2011) performs a holdings-based analysis using a multifactor
model composed of beta, industry dummies and fundamental factors to investigate the per-
formance of the KLD400 Social index from 1992 to 2010. They find that most of the out-
performance of KLD400 over S&P500 is factor-driven. For example, KLD400’s higher beta
accounted for 2/3 of the outperformance over the full sample period. They continue by divid-
ing the sample period into two. The period of nominal outperformance by KLD400 up until
1999 ”appears to have been entirely factor-driven, with beta, industries, and fundamental
factors accounting for virtually all of the observed active return”. However, in the following
period of underperformance until 2010, ”the factor bets are simply reversed”. Overall, they
find no significant alpha in either direction. The authors conclude that this is unsurprising,
because the research database for KLD400 has been available for quantitative analysts since
the early 1990s and that alpha-seeking investors would exploit any ESG-alphas as soon as
they were discovered.
Managi et al. (2012) use the Markov Switching model on return data of SRI indices and their
benchmarks in the U.S., U.K. and Japan from the early 2000s until 2008. They argue that,
”even if two markets have similar unconditional expected return and volatility, they could
be considerably different as conditional on the regime”. Their results show two distinct
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regimes, bull and bear, for the SRI indices and their benchmarks for all three countries.
More importantly, they find that these two regimes coincide in both occurrence and length
for the SRI indices and their benchmarks. Furthermore, they find strong evidence of co-
movement between the SRI indices and their benchmarks in each regime. Lastly, they find
no statistical difference in the mean or volatility of the SRI indices and their benchmarks in
either bull or bear regimes. Overall, they conclude that even when looking at conditional
mean and volatility, their findings is in alignment with much of the literature, which fails to
find a significant underperformance of SRI.
Boon et al. (2013) use a characteristic-based approach to test the performance of SRI funds.
This characteristic-based approach disaggregates performance into three components: man-
ager stock selection ability; manager characteristic timing ability and fund style. They find
that constraining portfolios, at least to a certain degree, neither enhance nor hinder fund
manager’s ability to generate returns. Furthermore, they find that SRI managers appear to
be better able to time style characteristics, especially the book-to-market factor, than their
conventional counterparts. Lastly, they find that SRI funds are biased towards large capital-
ization stocks, which underperformed over their sample period (2000 to 2010). They argue
that this is because large firms are able to devote more resources to meet the ESG demands
of positive screening.
Humphrey and Tan (2014) replicate 10,000 pairs of SRI and conventional portfolios to test
the impact of SRI screening on performance. Through this process, they remove poten-
tially interfering effects, such as manager skill and transaction costs. Measuring perfor-
mance through a one- and a four-factor model, they find no significant difference in the
risk-adjusted return of screened and unscreened portfolios. They conclude that a typical
SRI fund will neither gain nor lose from screening its portfolio. In a preceding working pa-
per using the same methodology, Humphrey and Tan (2011) investigate the different effects
of positive and negative screens on the performance of SRI funds. They find that positive
screening results in increased return, but also increased total risk and beta. Lastly, they find
that increasing the number of negative screens reduces the ability of SRI funds to diversify.
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Belghitar et al. (2014) criticize previous SRI research for not testing the prerequisites for
the methods used. For example, they argue that much of the previous research on SRI
ignores the non-normal distribution of return data. They solve this by using the Marginal
Conditional Stochastic Dominance (MCSD) framework, which can accommodate any return
distribution. Based on weekly data for six SRI indices, from July 2001 to November 2010,
they provide evidence that social responsible investing comes at a financial price. More
specifically, they conclude that there is nothing to be gained or lost from SRI in terms of
mean and variance, but in the higher moments of the return distribution there is a price to be
paid. On average, they find that conventional indices, compared to their SRI counterparts,
have a 27 % higher skewness and 15 % lower kurtosis. They conclude that risk-averse
investors can gain a higher utility by reducing their socially responsible holdings in favour
of conventional ones.
5 Data
Suitable indices should cover a long time span and have proper benchmarks for comparison.
We find that the KLD400 Social index from the American index producer MSCI (MSCI
2014) and four FTSE4Good indices from the British index producer FTSE (FTSE 2014b),
fulfills these requirements. Table 1 presents the SRI indices and their respective benchmarks,
as suggested by the index producers, used in this study. The indices provide us with good
coverage of the European and the American SRI market, which are the most developed ones,
as well as the global market. The FTSE4Good index family was created in 2001 and FTSE
constructed backtracking series back to January 1997, providing us with 18 years of data for
these indices. KLD400 was founded in 1990, but to obtain consistency across the data set
with regards to time span and sub-periods, we only use data back to January 1997.
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Table 1: The SRI indices and their benchmarks
# of constituents1 Screening
SRI Benchmark SRI BM SRI/BM2 Positive Negative
FTSE4G US FTSE USA 174 656 27 % Yes TAN
FTSE4G UK FTSE All-Share 243 642 38 % Yes TAN
FTSE4G Europe FTSE Dev Europe 312 519 60 % Yes TAN
FTSE4G Global FTSE Dev World 780 2115 37 % Yes TAN
KLD400 MSCI USA 400 628 64 % Yes AGTAFA + GMO
1 Number of constituents per December 31st 2014.
2 Number of constituents in the SRI indices divided by the number of constituents in their respective benchmarks.
TAN = Tobacco, Armaments, Nuclear power/weapons.
AGTAFA = Alcohol, Gambling, Tobacco, Armaments, Firearms, Adult entertainment.
GMO = Genetically Modified Organisms.
Table inspired by Gjølberg and Johnsen (2008).
5.1 MSCI KLD400
MSCI KLD400 is one of the oldest and best known of the socially responsible indices. It was
launched May 1st 1990 by KLD as the Domini 400 index and has had multiple third-party
index administrators since. MSCI assumed administration of the KLD400 in September
2010. The screening of the index is conducted using data from MSCI ESG Research. It
has an AGTAFA + GMO negative screening, meaning companies within alcohol, gambling,
tobacco, armaments, firearms, adult entertainment and genetically modified organisms are
excluded. MSCI combines the negative screening with an ESG best-in-class methodology.
The index is composed of 400 constituents, and has a target of only 200 large and mid-cap
companies. Due to this target, KLD400 consists of a large amount of small-cap companies.
Previously, the S&P500 was used as a benchmark for KLD400, but MSCI use their own
MSCI USA equity index instead (MSCI 2014). MSCI USA also contains a large amount
of small-cap companies, and we therefore agree that MSCI USA is a better benchmark than
S&P500, and use the former as a benchmark for KLD400 in this study.
5.2 FTSE4Good
The FTSE4Good indices are screened versions of conventional FTSE indices, covering dif-
ferent regions and countries. The European and global FTSE4Good versions are based on
FTSE Developed Europe and FTSE Developed World, respectively. The investable universe
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of the U.S. version is FTSE USA, while the U.K. version is based on FTSE All-Share, the
broad market index of the London Stock Exchange (FTSE 2014b). FTSE uses an exten-
sive ESG-rating model with more than 300 indicators to screen these indices. This model
utilizes both positive and negative screens, where the positive screening happens in conjunc-
tion with the ethical research firm EIRIS. The negative screening results in an exclusion of
tobacco, armaments, nuclear weapons and nuclear power (FTSE 2014c). Table 1 shows that
this screening process results in an inclusion of between 27-60 % of the constituents in the
benchmark indices.
5.3 Fama-French Factors
The Fama-French model was originally made for the American market, and analysis con-
ducted on other regions had to use the U.S. Fama-French factors. Kenneth French has later
added separate factors for developed markets to his database (French 2015). Fama and
French (2012) show that these factors are better suited for regional analysis. Therefore, we
use separate Fama-French factors for the U.S., European and global markets. It is important
to note that all these factors are denominated in U.S. dollars and use the U.S. one-month
Treasury bill as the risk-free rate. With dollar denominated Fama-French factors as inde-
pendent variables we require dollar denominated returns for all the dependent variables as
well, i.e. all the indices. Otherwise, exchange rate fluctuations will disrupt the results in
the Fama-French regressions. FTSE4Good UK and FTSE4Good Europe are denominated
in Pounds and Euros respectively, and must therefore be calculated into U.S. dollars.
5.4 Risk-free rate
When calculating the Sharpe ratios of the indices, we need the risk-free rate of return. For
the U.S. and global indices, we use the one-month U.S. Treasury bill. The Sharpe ratios
for the U.K. and European indices are calculated using return data denominated in their lo-
cal currencies and therefore require a risk-free rate that matches. For the U.K., we use the
British three-month Treasury bill. Obtaining the risk-free rate for Europe can be difficult,
since our sample period spans the introduction of the Euro. A solution is to use the govern-
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ment bill of a Euro-zone member, and we find the German three-month Bubill to be the best
choice.
5.5 Data collection
We download monthly total return data from January 1997 to December 2014 in USD from
Thomson Reuter’s DataStream (2015) for all the indices. For FTSE4Good UK, FTSE All-
Share and the European indices, we also gather the monthly total return data in their local
currencies. Specifically, we use DataStream’s Total Return Index (RI), which reinvests div-
idends. We download the Fama-French factors from Kenneth French’s homepage (French
2015), containing the market, value and size factors as well as the U.S. risk-free rate. The
U.K. risk-free rate is retrieved from Bank Of England (2015), while we get the German
risk-free rate from Bloomberg.
5.6 Sub-periods
The period from January 1997 to December 2014 consists of five distinct periods in the stock
markets: The tech-bubble in the late 1990s, the Dotcom Fall in the early 2000s, the growth
period in the mid-2000s, the Financial Crisis from 2007 to 2009 and finally the turbulent
recovery period from 2009 until today, disrupted by the European sovereign debt crisis.
On March 10th 2000, NASDAQ peaked (Bloomberg), marking the end of the tech-bubble
of the late 1990s. The stock markets fell through the spring and the financial climate did not
change until April 2003, defining the Dotcom Fall as April 2000 through March 2003. The
Financial Crisis can be dated back to August 2007, when BNP Paribas blocked withdrawals
from hedge funds because of complete lack of liquidity (Elliot 2012). However, this did not
manifest itself in the stock market before November 2007 (Figure 1). It is not clear exactly
when the crisis ended, but we see a distinct change in the return of the S&P500 in March
2009, and therefore define the Financial Crisis as November 2007 through February 2009.
The following years were plagued by the European sovereign debt crisis, but its effects
on the stock markets were drastically smaller and more sporadic than that of the Dotcom
Bredal & Nega˚rd
14 5 DATA
Fall and the Financial Crisis. Combined with the overall upwards trend of the stock markets
following the Financial Crisis, we do not find it beneficial to separate the European sovereign
debt crisis into a distinct period of falling markets. Hence, the three growth periods in the
sample are January 1997 through March 2000, April 2003 through October 2007 and March
2009 until the end of the sample in December 2014.
Figure 1: S&P 500 Total Return
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(Bloomberg)
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6 Descriptive statistics
6.1 Full sample period: 1997-2014
Table 2 presents the annualized mean return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios for all
the indices over the full sample period. We observe that the difference in mean return be-
tween the SRI indices and their benchmarks are small, ranging from –0.43 %-points p.a.
for FTSE4Good UK to 0.32 %-points p.a. for KLD400. Furthermore, all SRI indices, ex-
cept FTSE4Good UK, have a larger volatility than their benchmarks. The resulting Sharpe
ratios are smaller for four out of five SRI indices, indicating that SRI underperforms on a
risk-adjusted basis over the full sample period.
Table 2: SRI vs Benchmark Jan’97 - Dec’14
% Annualized Mean and Standard deviation
Full Sample Period
Mean return St.Dev Sharpe
FTSE4Good US 9.02 17.12 0.39
FTSE USA 9.31 15.66 0.43
Difference -0.29 1.46 -0.04
FTSE4Good UK 7.20 13.98 0.27
FTSE All-Share 7.63 14.30 0.29
Difference -0.43 -0.32 -0.02
FTSE4Good Europe 8.34 16.80 0.37
FTSE Dev Europe 8.38 16.32 0.39
Difference -0.04 0.48 -0.02
FTSE4Good Global 8.33 17.02 0.35
FTSE Dev World 8.10 15.87 0.36
Difference 0.23 1.15 -0.01
KLD400 9.48 16.03 0.44
MSCI USA 9.16 15.71 0.43
Difference 0.32 0.32 0.01
Mean return is annualized by (1+Rmonth)12−1. RMonth is the arithmetic monthly
mean. Stdev is annualized by StDevMonth ∗
√
12. StDevMonth is the arithmetic
monthly mean. Sharpe ratio = (µp− r f )/σp
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Figure 2 presents the cumulative return difference for the pairs of SRI and conventional in-
dices. Looking at cumulative return differences is useful because it reveals the total excess
return from holding an SRI index instead of its benchmark from January 1997. The cumula-
tive return difference is calculated using geometric mean and shows an even grimmer picture
of SRI. This can be explained by the large fluctuations in the return data, which causes the
geometric mean to be lower than the simple arithmetic mean (Gjølberg and Johnsen 2003).
We now observe that four out of five SRI indices deliver inferior returns when held over
the full sample period, compared to only three when using arithmetic mean (Table 2). An
investor holding the FTSE4Good US index over the full sample period would earn 10.8
%-points lower cumulative return, or -0.63 %-points p.a., than an investor holding FTSE
USA over the same period. The only SRI index providing a larger cumulative return than its
benchmark over the full sample period is KLD400 at 4.0 %-points, or 0.22 %-points p.a..
Figure 2: Cumulative Return Difference
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6.2 Dotcom Fall & Financial Crisis
Table 3 presents the annualized arithmetic mean return and standard deviation for all the
indices under the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis. During the Dotcom Fall, all the SRI
indices deliver inferior returns at a higher volatility, except for FTSE4Good UK, which have
a marginally lower volatility. The worst performing SRI index in this period is FTSE4Good
US, delivering an annualized 3.01 %-points lower return at 2.28 %-points higher volatil-
ity than its benchmark. In contrast to the Dotcom Fall, there are no clear patterns in the
descriptive statistics for the Financial Crisis. For example, we observe that FTSE4Good
US deliver an annualized 2.68 %-points lower return at 1.40 %-points higher volatility than
FTSE USA, while KLD400 deliver an annualized 1.18 %-points higher return at 0.68 %-
points lower volatility than MSCI USA.
Table 3: SRI vs. Benchmark - Falling stock markets
% Annualized Mean and Standard Deviation
Dotcom Fall Financial Crisis
Mean Return StDev Mean Return StDev
FTSE4G US -18.15 19.79 -42.39 20.49
FTSE USA -15.14 17.51 -39.71 19.09
Difference -3.01 2.28 -2.68 1.40
FTSE4G UK -14.88 15.50 -30.89 18.81
FTSE All-Share -14.21 16.04 -31.43 19.09
Difference -0.67 -0.54 0.54 -0.28
FTSE4G Europe -21.38 19.30 -42.17 17.93
FTSE Dev Europe -19.42 18.24 -42.51 18.36
Difference -1.96 1.06 0.34 -0.43
FTSE4G Global -18.38 17.87 -44.13 21.51
FTSE Dev World -16.20 16.07 -42.34 21.00
Difference -2.18 1.80 -1.79 0.51
KLD400 -16.01 17.90 -38.72 18.48
MSCI USA -15.92 17.33 -39.90 19.16
Difference -0.09 0.57 1.18 -0.68
Mean return is annualized by (1+RMonth)12−1. RMonth is the arithmetic monthly mean.
Stdev is annualized by StDevMonth ∗
√
12. StDevMonth is the arithmetic monthly mean.
All Sharpe ratios for the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis are negative, and therefore
excluded because of their potential misleading interpretations (Israelsen 2003). For those
interested, the Sharpe ratios can be found in Table A1.
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6.3 Size and sector characteristics
An interesting feature of the SRI indices is their tilt towards specific sectors and larger firms
(Gjølberg and Johnsen 2008, Boon et al. 2013). Figure 3 illustrates the average and median
market capitalization of the constituents for FTSE4Good Global and its benchmark. The
average constituent in FTSE4Good Global is 38.1 % larger than the benchmark’s, while the
median constituent is 36 % larger. Boon et al. (2013) argue that this tilt towards large firms
is because they are able to devote more resources to meet the ESG demands of positive
screening. Another reason entirely may be that large firms are more in the public’s view
and may reap a greater reputational benefit from being part of an SRI index, and as a conse-
quence intensifies their CSR practices (Mortier 2014). For example, the long-lasting boycott
of Nestle´, the world’s biggest producer of infant formula, was lifted by many organizations
after its inclusion in the FTSE4Good index family in 2011 (Nestle´ 2011a). However, to
remain included in the FTSE4Good index family, Nestle´ is required to have their infant for-
mula marketing practices continuously verified by PwC (Nestle´ 2011b), which is expensive,
illustrating that Boon et al. (2013) also have a valid argument.
Figure 3: Average and median size of constituents
Average Median
5
10
15
20
N
et
M
ar
ke
tC
ap
,B
ill
io
n
U
SD
FTSE4G Global
FTSE Dev World
(FTSE 2014a)
Bredal & Nega˚rd
6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 19
Figure 4 presents the sector weights of FTSE4Good Global, FTSE4Good US and their
benchmarks. The service sector includes customer service, health care and financial ser-
vices, the industry sector consists of traditional industries like energy companies, utilities
and material production, while the technology sector comprises technology, IT and telecom-
munication companies. Compared to their benchmarks, the SRI indices have larger weights
in the service and technology sectors, and smaller weights in the industrial sector. For ex-
ample, 33 % of the companies in FTSE4Good US are from the technology sector, compared
to only 19 % in FTSE USA. The screening of FTSE4Good US has therefore resulted in
42 % more companies in the technology sector than its benchmark (FTSE USA), which is
considerable.
Figure 4: Industry composition of SRI versus benchmarks
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These differences in average constituent size and sector composition are likely important
determinants of the observed differences in return and volatility of the SRI indices and their
benchmarks. For example, if the differences in sector weights were somewhat equal in
the Dotcom Fall, during which technology stocks plummeted, this could help explain the
inferior return of the SRI indices seen in Table 3.
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Investors do not receive higher return as compensation for taking on non-systematic risk.
Therefore, the risk and return characteristics presented under the descriptive statistics does
not accurately depict the financial performance of SRI. To obtain a correct estimate of the
financial performance of SRI, we need to use an asset-pricing model that incorporates sys-
tematic risk factors. Consequently, we base our analysis on Fama-French’s three-factor
asset-pricing model (Fama and French 1992, 1993). We use this basic three-factor model
to investigate SRI performance over the full sample period, as well as an expanded version
with dummy variables and interaction terms to capture the distinct effects of SRI screening
in periods of falling stock markets. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS).
7.1 Identification strategy
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French find that high book-to-market (value) stocks usually out-
perform low book-to-market (growth) stocks. They also find that small capitalization stocks
tend to outperform large capitalization stocks. The rationale behind the value and size pre-
miums is that value stocks and small capitalization stocks on average are riskier, less liquid
and more prone to mispricing, but over time they tend to yield a higher return. Based on
this research, they added a value factor and a size factor to the capital asset-pricing model
(CAPM), resulting in model (1).
Re = α+β1Market +β2SMB+β3HML+ εi (1)
The dependent variable in model (1) is the expected excess return. The market factor is the
excess return of the market over the risk-free rate. The size factor, SMB (Small minus Big),
is the average return on three portfolios of small capitalization stocks minus the average
return on three portfolios of large capitalization stocks. The book-to-market factor, HML
(High minus Low), is the average return of two high book-to-market portfolios minus the
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average return of two low book-to market portfolios (French 2015). Since we are interested
in how the SRI indices perform compared to their conventional benchmark indices, we need
to replace the dependent variable with the differential return between the SRI indices and
their benchmarks to obtain model (2). This transformation allows us to use the return of
the benchmarks minus the risk-free rate (RBM-r f ) as a stand-in for the market factor, but we
use the regional market factors provided by Kenneth French’s database (French 2015). The
regional market factors are almost perfectly correlated with (RBM-r f ), and the choice makes
little difference.
RSRI−RBM = α+β1Market +β2SMB+β3HML+ εi (2)
The regression output provides us with estimates for alpha (α), three betas (β ) and an error
term (ε). A positive (negative) alpha indicates that the SRI index has outperformed (un-
derperformed) its respective benchmark. The three betas represent the difference in factor
loadings between the SRI index and its benchmark, while the error term represents the un-
explained return differences. Since the dependent variable is transformed into the return
difference between an SRI index and its benchmark, we should not be surprised if the re-
gressions have low R2. This is because the return of an appropriate benchmark already
explains much of the return variation in the SRI index.
7.2 Expanded Fama-French
To test the performance of SRI versus conventional benchmarks in periods of falling stock
markets, we can include dummy variables for the different market regimes into the model.
In the Sub-period section, we divide the sample into three long periods of steady growth and
two shorter periods of falling stock markets. These two periods of falling stock markets,
the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis, were fundamentally different in nature. Whereas
the first consisted of a prolonged market correction from the tech-bubble of the late 1990s,
the latter involved a global liquidity crisis and recession. Therefore, we prefer to use two
separate dummy variables for these periods, while keeping the three growth periods as the
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base category, resulting in model (3).
RSRI−RBM = α+β1Market +β2SMB+β3HML+
δ1DDotcomFall +δ2DFinancialCrisis + εi
(3)
The addition of the dummy variables allow for different intercepts in the model, depending
on whether we are looking at the Dotcom Fall, the Financial Crisis or the growth periods in
the base category. However, it does not allow for different slope coefficients in the different
periods. If the Fama-French factor returns vary significantly, this could lead to coefficients
with a poor fit. For example, Figure 5 shows that the differences in the European value
premium between the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis are substantial. The average
annualized European value premium is 39.01 % during the Dotcom Fall and -8.83 % during
the Financial Crisis (Table A10). A difference of 47.84 %-points is large and should be
adjusted for. Similar arguments can be made for the other regional Fama-French factors.
To allow the coefficients to vary with the different periods, we construct interaction terms
between each dummy variable and Fama-French factor, resulting in model (4).
RSRI−RBM =α+β1Market +β2SMB+β3HML+δ1DDotcomFall +δ2DFinancialCrisis+
γ1(Market ∗DDotcomFall)+ γ2(SMB∗DDotcomFall)+
γ3(HML∗DDotcomFall)+ γ4(Market ∗DFinancialCrisis)+
γ5(SMB∗DFinancialCrisis)+ γ6(HML∗DFinancialCrisis)+ εi
(4)
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Figure 5: Monthly European value premium - Dotcom Fall and Financial Crisis
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The addition of the dummy variables and the interaction terms alters the interpretation of the
coefficients in the model. A positive (negative) alpha now indicates that the SRI index has
outperformed (underperformed) against its conventional benchmark over the three growth
periods in the sample combined. On the other hand, the correct performance estimate for
the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis is now their respective delta coefficient (δ ) plus
the alpha term (α). The interpretation of the difference in the factor loadings between the
SRI indices and their benchmarks has also changed. The betas now represent the growth
periods, while the estimates for the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis now consists of
their respective gammas (γ) plus the betas (β ). However, from here on out, when referring to
the coefficients for the Financial Crisis or the Dotcom Fall, we will for ease of interpretation
refer to (α + δ ) and (β + γ) as purely alpha and beta.
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7.3 Model requirements
We test whether any of the variables used in model (2) and model (4) are non-stationary,
i.e. they display signs of unit roots. If the variables have unit roots, then the central limit
theorem no longer applies, making large sample normal approximations invalid. This would
make it impossible to trust the t-statistics and F-statistics. Furthermore, using non-stationary
variables could lead to spurious regressions that cannot be trusted. For example, spurious
regressions could show a causal relationship between two trending variables when there in
fact is none (Wooldridge 2012). Table A3 presents the results from the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test, which rejects the null hypothesis of unit roots for all the variables, indicating that
we can safely use them.
We perform postestimation tests on the residuals from each regression to ascertain whether
the requirements for OLS are met. Table A4 shows the results from the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, while Table A5 presents the results from the Durbin-
Watson test for first-order autocorrelation. We observe problems of both heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation in several of the regressions from model (2) and model (4). Neither
heteroskedasticity nor autocorrelation leads to biased estimators, but they lead to incorrect
standard errors and t-statistics. To safeguard against this, we compute Newey-West standard
errors for all the regressions, which are consistent in the face of both heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2012). We also test whether the residuals are normally dis-
tributed (Table A6). The null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is rejected for a
substantial amount of the regressions. However, we should not be too concerned about this.
Since the included variables follow a stationary process and because we work with a large
number of observations, we can be confident that the central limit theorem applies, which
allows us to dispense with the requirement of normally distributed residuals (Wooldridge
2012).
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8 Results
8.1 Main Findings
Table 4 presents the annualized differences in Fama-French factor contributions between the
SRI indices and their benchmarks. The first number column presents the gross excess returns
of the SRI indices over their benchmarks, while the second number column presents the
annualized alphas, i.e. the factor-adjusted excess returns. We can think of these annualized
alphas as the actual contribution from SRI after adjusting for systematic risk factors. The
following three columns present the difference in annualized factor contributions from the
market, size and value factors of the SRI indices relative to their benchmarks. Finally, the
last column shows the aggregated differences in factor contributions, and whether these are
positive (upwards arrow) or negative (downwards arrow).
Table 4: Fama-French Contributions
% Annualized difference returns, alphas and contributions.
SRI-BM Alpha Market Size Value
Full sample FTSE4G US -0.26 -0.37 0.42*** -0.07 -0.24** ⇑ (0.11)
(Jan’97- Dec ’14) FTSE4G UK -0.42 -0.27 -0.23*** -0.02 0.10 ⇓ (-0.15)
FTSE4G Europe -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 ⇓ (-0.09)
FTSE4G Global 0.22 0.21 0.31*** -0.03*** -0.27** ⇑ (0.01)
KLD400 0.30 0.35 -0.02 0.08 -0.11** ⇓ (-0.05)
Financial Crisis FTSE4G US -4.61 -6.59** 2.97 0.90*** -1.89*** ⇑ (1.98)
(Nov’07 - Feb’09) FTSE4G UK 0.04 -1.91 1.80*** 0.77*** -0.62 ⇑ (1.95)
FTSE4G Europe -0.49 -2.65** 2.73*** 0.12 -0.69 ⇑ (2.16)
FTSE4G Global -2.82 -1.70 -0.50 0.26 -0.88** ⇓ (-1.12)
KLD400 0.96 -3.11* 4.53*** 0.55*** -1.01*** ⇑ (4.07)
Dotcom Fall FTSE4G US -3.57 -1.55 -0.95 0.38 -1.45 ⇓ (-2.02)
(April’00 - Mar’03) FTSE4G UK -0.80 -2.22* 0.98*** 0.07** 0.37 ⇑ (1.42)
FTSE4G Europe -2.54 -1.75 -0.16 0.10*** -0.73 ⇓ (-0.79)
FTSE4G Global -2.69 0.59 -1.31*** -0.12 -1.85** ⇓ (-3.28)
KLD400 -0.19 -0.28 0.36 0.38* -0.65 ⇑ (0.09)
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 All regressions use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags, where the number of lags is
determined by 4(n/100)2/9 (Newey and West 1987). The Alphas are annualized by (1+α)12− 1. We derive the contributions by
multiplying the annualized Fama-French factor returns (Table 5) with the regression coefficients from model (2) and (4) (Table 6).
We use model (2) for the full period, while we obtain the coefficients for the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis from the expanded
Fama-French model (4). (SRI-BM) is calculated by summarizing the contributions from the market, size and value factors and the
alphas, and will therefore deviate slightly from Table 2 and Table 3. Table inspired by Gjølberg and Johnsen (2008).
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We do not find any significant alphas in either direction over the full sample period. The
annualized alphas range from positive 0.35 %-points for KLD400 to negative 0.37 %-points
for FTSE4Good US. This result is in alignment with previous literature, which largely con-
cludes that there is neither a gain nor a loss from socially responsible investing. During
the Financial Crisis we find that all the SRI indices underperform against their conventional
benchmarks. This underperformance is significant for FTSE4Good US, FTSE4Good Eu-
rope and KLD400. The magnitude of the annualized alphas are substantial, ranging from
negative 1.70 %-points for FTSE4Good Global to negative 6.59 %-points for FTSE4Good
US. This same pattern is evident for the Dotcom Fall, where four out of five SRI indices un-
derperform against their benchmarks, although only FTSE4Good UK does so significantly.
These results support the underperformance hypothesis, indicating that investors suffer sub-
stantial financial losses from SRI in periods of falling markets.
The large differences between the gross excess returns and the factor-adjusted excess returns
in the Dotcom Fall and the Financial Crisis, show the importance of adjusting for differences
in factor contributions between the SRI indices and their benchmarks. The arrows in the last
column pointing upwards (downwards) indicate that we will overestimate (underestimate)
the performance of SRI if we do not adjust for these differences in factor contributions, while
the numbers in parentheses indicate by how much. For example, during the Financial Crisis,
KLD400 receives a positive contribution from the market factor at 4.53 %-points, a positive
contribution from the size factor at 0.55 %-points and a negative contribution from the value
factor at 1.01 %-points, resulting in an aggregated difference in factor contribution of 4.07
%-points. These 4.07 %-points could alternatively be obtained by investing in a conventional
portfolio operating with the same factor bets as the KLD400 and does not represent an
outperformance due to SRI screening. The same can of course be said in cases where the
aggregated differences in factor contributions are negative, such as for FTSE4Good Global
during the Dotcom Fall at negative 3.28 %-points.
For the full sample period, the aggregated differences in factor contributions are small for all
the indices and display no clear trend. As a result, the gross excess returns are close to the
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factor-adjusted excess returns. Contrary, during the Financial Crisis four out of five SRI in-
dices receive a large and positive aggregated factor contribution relative to their benchmarks,
resulting in markedly lower factor-adjusted excess returns than gross excess returns. In other
words, the factor loadings of the SRI indices proved favourable when the markets crashed.
For the Dotcom Fall, there are no clear trends in the aggregated difference in factor contri-
butions, but most of the differences are of a large magnitude. For example, FTSE4Good US
can attribute 2.02 %-points of its negative gross excess return in this period to unfavourable
factor returns, while the gross excess return of FTSE4Good UK would be 1.42 %-points
worse after adjusting for its favourable factor returns. The following subsection dissects
the aggregated difference in factor contribution for each index pair into its market, size and
value components.
8.2 Differences in systematic risk factors
Table 5 shows the annualized market, size and value premiums for the full sample period,
the Financial Crisis and the Dotcom Fall for all regions. Table 6 presents the differences
in Fama-Fench factor loadings between the SRI indices and their benchmarks. Unless oth-
erwise stated, all factor contributions in this subsection are annualized differences between
the SRI indices and their benchmarks.
Table 5: Annualized Fama-French factors
Market Size Value
Full sample US 7.00 % 2.98 % 2.90 %
(Jan’97 - Dec’14) Europe 6.45 % 0.48 % 5.74 %
Global 5.88 % 0.27 % 4.83 %
Financial Crisis US -40.67 % 2.30 % -11.09 %
(Nov’07 - Feb’09) Europe -47.69 % -5.05% -8.83 %
Global -43.24 % -2.34 % -5.05 %
Dotcom Fall US -18.19 % 5.60 % 23.72 %
(April’00 - Mar’03) Europe -18.60 % -0.59 % 39.01 %
Global -18.94 % 1.34 % 33.27 %
Factor returns annualized by (1+RFactor)12−1.
RFactor is monthly factor return
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Table 6: Fama-French Coefficients
Factor loadings and % annualized alphas.
Alpha Market Size Value R2
Full sample FTSE4G US -0.37 0.06*** -0.02 -0.08** 0.15
(Jan’97 - Dec’14) FTSE4G UK -0.27 -0.04*** -0.04 0.02 0.08
FTSE4G Europe 0.03 0.00 -0.11*** 0.00 0.20
FTSE4G Global 0.21 0.05*** -0.12 *** -0.06** 0.24
KLD400 0.35 0.00 0.03 -0.04** 0.06
Financial Crisis FTSE4G US -6.59** -0.07 0.31*** 0.17*** 0.28
(Nov’07-Feb’09) FTSE4G UK -1.91 -0.04*** -0.15*** 0.07 0.14
FTSE4G Europe -2.65** -0.06*** -0.02 0.08 0.28
FTSE4G Global -1.70 0.01 -0.11 0.17** 0.28
KLD400 -3.11* -0.11*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.14
Dotcom Fall FTSE4G US -1.55 0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.28
(April’00-Mar’03) FTSE4G UK -2.22* -0.05*** -0.12** 0.01 0.14
FTSE4G Europe -1.75 0.01 -0.17*** -0.02 0.28
FTSE4G Global 0.59 0.07*** -0.09 -0.06** 0.28
KLD400 -0.28 -0.02 0.07* -0.03 0.14
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 All regressions use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags, where the number of lags is
determined by 4(n/100)2/9 (Newey and West 1987). The coefficients for the Full sample period are estimated using model (2). See
Table A7 for the regression output. The coefficients for the Financial Crisis and the Dotcom Fall are from model (4). See Table A8 for
the regression output. Alphas for Financial Crisis and (DotcomFall) = αGrowthCombined +δ1(2) and then annualized. Betas for Financial
Crisis and (Dotcom Fall) = Coefficients for Growth Combined + γ1/2/3/(4/5/6). All (α+δ ) and (β +γ) are tested for joint significance.
8.2.1 Value factor
The contributions from the value factor are substantial and negative for most of the SRI
indices over the full sample period, as well as for the two periods of falling stock markets
(Table 4). Over the full period and during the Dotcom Fall, we can explain these negative
contributions by the SRI indices’ tilt towards growth stocks (Table 6) combined with a pos-
itive value premium (Table 5). During the Dotcom Fall, the negative contributions from the
value factor are larger than for the full period, which is because the value premium soared
in this period. The large value premium can be explained by the dramatic fall in the valu-
ation of typical growth sectors, such as IT, telecom and technology, in the aftermath of the
tech-bubble in the late 1990s.
During the Financial Crisis, we observe that the SRI indices shift their tilt towards value
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stocks. We do not have access to constituent data for the SRI indices and their benchmarks,
so a discussion of the reason behind this shift would be purely speculative. Since value
stocks underperform growth stocks in this period, the SRI indices unanimously receive neg-
ative contributions from the value factor. For example, FTSE4Good US can attribute 1.89
%-points, significant at the 1 %-level, of its negative gross excess return to the unfavorable
loading on the value factor in this period.
8.2.2 Size factor
The SRI indices display a tilt towards large capitalization stocks for the full period. The
exception is KLD400, which has a larger, but insignificant, weighting in small capitalization
stocks than its benchmark. This is likely due to the specific diversification requirement of
KLD400, discussed in section 5.1. The resulting contributions from the size factor are small
for all the indices. For example, the tilt towards large capitalization stocks of FTSE4Good
Global relative to its benchmark is significant at the 1 % level, but resulted in a negative
contribution from the size factor of a mere 0.03 %-points.
In the Financial Crisis, we observe that all the SRI indices receive a positive contribution
from the size factor, significant for FTSE4Good US, FTSE4Good UK and KLD400. The
positive contributions of the European, U.K. and Global SRI indices can be explained by
their tilt toward large companies, which outperformed small companies in Europe and glob-
ally. Contrary, large companies underperform small companies in the U.S. in this period. For
KLD400, which consistently tilt towards small companies throughout the sample, this yields
a positive factor contribution of 0.55 %-points. More surprisingly, we find that FTSE4Good
US changed its tilt significantly towards small companies, resulting in a positive contribu-
tion from the size factor at 0.90 %-points. This shift towards small companies can partially
be explained by the corresponding shift towards value companies. The correlation between
the value and size premium during the Financial Crisis is positive at 34.98 %, illustrat-
ing that value companies are typically smaller than growth companies. Therefore, when
FTSE4Good US changed its tilt towards value stocks, it is reasonable that the average size
of its constituents should fall as well.
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During the Dotcom Fall, we observe that small companies outperform large companies in
the U.S. and globally, but not in Europe. This inferior return of small companies in Europe
is consistent with Lu and Chollete (2010) who shows that the positive factor contribution
from loading on small companies holds over the long run, but may have shorter-run regime
shifts. Combined with the tilts of FTSE4Good UK and FTSE4Good Europe towards large
companies during the Dotcom Fall, the resulting contributions from the size factor are pos-
itive and significant for these indices. The tilts of the remaining SRI indices remain mostly
the same as for the full period.
8.2.3 Market factor
Most of the contributions from the market factor are of a larger magnitude than those from
the size and value factors. The main reason for these large contributions are the substantial
factor returns from loading on the market factor and not the loading differences themselves.
For example, the coefficient on the market factor and the coefficient on the size factor for
FTSE4Good UK over the full sample period is equal at -0.04. However, the average return
from loading on the market factor at 6.45 % p.a. is considerably larger than the average
return from loading on the size factor at 0.48 % p.a.. As a result, the negative contribution
from the market factor at 0.23 %-points is noticeably larger than the negative contribution
from the size factor at 0.02 %-points.
For the full sample period and the Dotcom Fall, there are no clear trends in the loadings
on the market factor. In the Financial Crisis however, four out of five SRI indices were
less exposed to the market than their benchmarks, three of them significantly, which proved
advantageous when the markets crashed. For example, KLD400 receive a positive factor
contribution of 4.53 %-points due to this lower market exposure, significant at the 1 %-
level. The lower market exposure in the Financial Crisis can partially be explained by the
tilts on the size factor and the value factor in this period. Fama and French (1993) show
that growth stocks generally have a higher market beta than value stocks, while large stocks
generally have a lower market beta than small stocks. The SRI indices display a tilt towards
value stocks during the Financial Crisis, which can explain some of the reduced market
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exposure. In the same fashion, the tilt towards large stocks of the SRI indices outside of the
U.S. may have further reduced their market exposure, while the U.S. indices’ tilt towards
small stocks may have increased theirs.
9 Discussion
The results imply that there are no financial gains nor losses from SRI if the investment
horizon is long, indicating that the benefits of screening for ESG criteria offsets the disad-
vantages. However, the results also point toward substantial financial losses from SRI in the
Financial Crisis and in the Dotcom Fall. This means that the adverse effects of SRI, such
as the increased idiosyncratic risk from the reduced investment universe and skewed sector
tilts, outweighs the benefits, resulting in SRI underperforming conventional investments in
periods of falling stock markets.
9.1 Practical implications
The above findings have important implications for the types of investors that should be
involved in SRI. For example, most pension funds and university endowment funds have an
infinite investment horizon and are not as preoccupied with the short-term fluctuations of
their portfolios. If the concept of SRI sounds appealing to the principals of these funds, then
they can invest without having to fear inferior financial returns. Contrary, investors with
a shorter investment horizon, investors with lower risk tolerance and institutional investors
under heavy public scrutiny should all be wary of SRI. These types of investors might find it
difficult enough to weather periods of falling markets without adding the idiosyncratic risk
caused by SRI screening.
9.2 Theoretical implications
Our findings expand on the previous literature on SRI performance by adjusting for both
systematic risk factors and different market regimes simultaneously. When only adjusting
for systematic risk factors, Kurtz and DiBartolomeo (2011) find that the differences in per-
formance between KLD400 and its benchmark are purely factor driven. Likewise, when
adjusting for different market regimes, but not adjusting for systematic risk factors, Managi
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et al. (2012) find no under- or outperformance by the SRI indices they investigate. There-
fore, the underperformance of the SRI indices in periods of falling markets revealed in our
results indicate that adjusting for both systematic risk factors and different market regimes
together might be beneficial.
9.3 Limitations and further research
A major problem when working with this study was the lack of holding data for the indices.
These data are tremendously expensive and our attempts at obtaining these free of charge
from FTSE and MSCI have been fruitless. Future researchers should attempt to obtain hold-
ing data for all the indices to be able to control for industries in the regression models.
Furthermore, with the increased popularity of SRI follows an increased number of SRI in-
dices. If the number of trustworthy SRI indices reach a certain level, one should consider
using panel data techniques. Specifically, one would then be able to combine the effects of
the different screening systems between each index family into one aggregate. This panel
data regression would yield a single alpha term, representing a more accurate measurement
of SRI performance. Lastly, we have not attempted to discern whether performance varies
between SRI indices exclusively using positive or negative screening. This is because all the
trustworthy SRI indices with a comparable benchmark we could find utilize both. Hopefully,
future research will be able to overcome this problem.
10 Conclusion
In this study, we expand on previous research on SRI performance by investigating the return
difference of five regionally diverse sets of SRI indices and their benchmarks over an 18-
year period from 1997 to 2014. Through a Fama-French three-factor model, we account
for differences in systematic risk factors between the SRI indices and their benchmarks,
specifically the tendency of the SRI indices to tilt towards large growth stocks. The results
show that there are no financial gains nor losses from investing in the SRI indices instead
of their benchmarks if the investment horizon is long, indicating that the benefits of SRI
screening offsets the disadvantages.
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Among these disadvantages is an increase in the idiosyncratic risk caused by the reduced
investment universe and skewed sector tilts from SRI screening. We hypothesize that this
increased idiosyncratic risk is more likely to translate into inferior risk-adjusted returns in
periods of falling markets, when having a well-diversified portfolio is crucial. To test this
hypothesis, we expand the Fama-French three-factor model with dummy variables for the
Dotcom Fall in the early 2000s and the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009. Furthermore, to
adjust for the large variations in the market, size and value premiums in these periods, we
include interaction terms in the model. The results show large financial losses from investing
in the SRI indices instead of their benchmarks in both periods of falling markets.
The findings in this study implies that SRI performs on par with conventional investments in
the long run and therefore might be a suitable investment option for investors with an infinite
investment horizon, such as pension funds and university endowment funds. However, the
inferior risk-adjusted returns in periods of falling markets should make investors concerned
with short-term portfolio fluctuations wary of SRI.
A limitation in the study is the lack of holding data, preventing us from controlling for
differences in industry weights between the SRI indices and their benchmarks. Another
limitation is that all the SRI indices in our sample use both positive and negative screening.
By using the methods presented in this study, and by including indices that only use positive
or negative screening, future researchers can attempt to discern how the different screening
methods affect SRI performance in the long run and in times of falling markets.
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A Appendix
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table A1: Sharpe Ratios
Full Sample Tech Bubble Dotcom Fall Growth Financial Crisis Recovery/Growth
Jan’97-Dec’14 Jan’97-Mar ’00 April’00 - Mar’03 April’03-Oct’07 Nov’07-Feb’09 Mar’09-Dec’14
FTSE4G US 0.39 1.48 -1.10 1.34 -2.16 1.76
FTSE USA 0.44 1.38 -1.07 1.71 -2.18 1.71
FTSE4G UK 0.27 1.00 -1.26 1.69 -1.85 1.19
FTSE All-Share 0.29 0.88 -1.17 1.92 -1.86 1.18
FTSE4G Europe 0.37 1.76 -1.31 2.03 -2.52 1.32
FTSE Dev Europe 0.39 1.62 -1.28 2.22 -2.47 1.29
FTSE4G Global 0.35 1.45 -1.23 2.09 -2.14 1.23
FTSE Dev World 0.36 1.12 -1.23 2.31 -2.11 1.29
KLD400 0.44 1.53 -1.09 1.38 -2.20 1.70
MSCI USA 0.43 1.39 -1.12 1.66 -2.18 1.70
Sharpe ratio = (µp - r f )/ σp
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics
% Annualized Mean return and Standard deviation
Full sample Tech Bubble Dotcom Fall Growth Financial Crisis Recovery/growth
(Jan’97 - Dec’14) (Jan’97 - Mar’00) (Arpil’00 - Mar’03) (April’03 - Oct’07) (Nov’07 - Feb’09) (Mar’09 - Dec’14)
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
FTSE4G US 9.02 % 17.12% 33.62 % 19.31 % -18.15 % 19.79 % 14.81 % 8.89 % -42.39 % 20.49 % 24.40 % 13.84 %
FTSE USA 9.31 % 15.66 % 28.51 % 17.10 % -15.14 % 17.51 % 16.89 % 8.18 % -39.71 % 19.09 % 22.93 % 13.42%
Diff -0.29% 1.46 % 5.11 % 2.21 % -3.01 % 2.28 % -2.08 % 0.71 % -2.68 % 1.40 % 1.47 % 0.42 %
FTSE4G UK 7.20% 13.98 % 19.71 % 13.60 % -14.88 % 15.50 % 18.07 % 8.00 % -30.89 % 18.81 % 15.86 % 13.01 %
FTSE All-Share 7.63% 14.30 % 18.64 % 14.26 % -14.21 % 16.04 % 20.42 % 8.26 % -31.43 % 19.09 % 15.82 % 13.09 %
Diff -0.43 % -0.32 % 1.07 % -0.66 % -0.67 % -0.54 % -2.35 % -0.26 % 0.54 % -0.28 % 0.04 % -0.08 %
FTSE4G Europe 8.34 % 16.80% 37.30 % 19.34 % -21.38 % 19.30 % 21.13 % 9.23 % -42.17 % 17.93 % 17.49 % 13.18 %
FTSE Dev Europe 8.38% 16.32% 33.00 % 18.28 % -19.42 % 18.24 % 22.82 % 9.20 % -42.51 % 18.36 % 17.13 % 13.22 %
Diff -0.04% 0.48% 4.30 % 1.06 % -1.96 % 1.06 % -1.69 % 0.03 % 0.34 % -0.43 % 0.36 % -0.04 %
FTSE4G Global 8.33% 17.02% 29.10 % 16.70 % -18.38 % 17.87 % 21.64 % 8.96 % -44.13 % 21.51 % 19.82 % 16.09 %
FTSE Dev World 8.10% 15.87% 22.16 % 15.36 % -16.20 % 16.07 % 22.73 % 8.57 % -42.34 % 21.00 % 19.52 % 15.09 %
Diff 0.23% 1.15% 6.94 % 1.34 % -2.18 % 1.80 % -1.09 % 0.39 % -1.79 % 0.51 % 0.30 % 1.00 %
KLD400 9.48% 16.03% 32.90 % 18.24 % -16.01 % 17.90 % 15.17 % 8.85 % -38.72 % 18.48 % 22.84 % 13.41 %
MSCI USA 9.16% 15.71% 28.99 % 17.24 % -15.92 % 17.33 % 16.72 % 8.32 % -39.90 % 19.16 % 22.95 % 13.44 %
Diff 0.32% 0.31% 3.91 % 1.00 % -0.09 % 0.57 % -1.55 % 0.53 % 1.18 % -0.68 % -0.11 % -0.03 %
Mean return is annualized by (1+RMonth)12−1. RMonth is the arithmetic monthly mean.
Stdev is annualized by StDevMonth ∗
√
12. StDevMonth is the arithmetic monthly mean.
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A.2 Diagnostic tests
Table A3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots
Number1 Test2 Unit3
Variable of lags statistic roots
Diff FTSE4G US 11 -3.381 Rejected***
Diff FTSE4G UK 13 -2.396 Rejected**
Diff FTSE4G Europe 11 -2.252 Rejected**
Diff FTSE4G Global 11 -1.892 Rejected*
Diff KLD400 13 -3.039 Rejected***
Market U.S. 11 -3.284 Rejected***
Size U.S. 13 -3.938 Rejected***
Value U.S. 10 -3.697 Rejected***
Market Europe 14 -3.388 Rejected***
Size Europe 12 -3.454 Rejected***
Value Europe 10 -3.150 Rejected***
Market Global 14 -3.447 Rejected***
Size Global 14 -2.587 Rejected**
Value Global 10 -3.270 Rejected***
1 We find the optimal number of lags by running a Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least
Squares (DF-GLS) test on each variable and using the Modified Akaike’s Information
Criterion (MAIC) (Ng and Perron 2001).
2 Obtained from the ADF test with the MAIC optimal number of lags. None of the
variables have a significant trend or constant term, so we run ADF without adding trend
and by removing the constant term.
3Test statistics are compared to the Dickey-Fuller distribution. H0: Unit roots
* = significant 10 %, ** = significant 5%, ***= significant 1%
Table A4: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg
Test for heteroskedasticity
FF model (2) Expanded FF model (4)
P-value Homoskedasticity P-value Homoskedasticity
FTSE4G US 0.9614 Not Rejected 0.4680 Not Rejected
FTSE4G UK 0.5690 Not Rejected 0.1466 Not Rejected
FTSE4G Europe 0.0049 Rejected*** 0.0724 Rejected*
FTSE4G Global 0.4380 Not Rejected 0.2665 Not Rejected
KLD400 0.2274 Not Rejected 0.7994 Not Rejected
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
H0: Constant variance
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Table A5: Durbin-Watson
Test for first-order autocorrelation
FF model (2) Expanded FF model (4)
d Positive1 Negative2 d Positive1 Negative2
FTSE4G US 2.03 Not Rejected Not Rejected 2.08 Not Rejected Not Rejected
FTSE4G UK 2.63 Not Rejected Rejected 2.63 Not Rejected Rejected
FTSE4G Europe 2.26 Not Rejected Inconclusive 2.36 Not Rejected Rejected
FTSE4G Global 1.95 Not Rejected Not Rejected 1.95 Not Rejected Not Rejected
KLD400 1.92 Not Rejected Not Rejected 1.98 Not Rejected Not Rejected
1 H0 = No positive first-order autocorrelation
2 H0 = No negative first-order autocorrelation
”d” is the Durbin-Watson test statistic. We use (4-d) to test for first-order negative autocorrelation.
Model (2): k=4 , n=216, α=0.05 gives dlower= 1.73 and dupper=1.81
Model (4): k=12 , n=216, α=0.05 gives dlower= 1.67 and dupper=1.87
Table A6: Shapiro-Wilk normality test
FF model (2) Expanded FF model (4)
FTSE4G US Not Rejected Not Rejected
FTSE4G UK Rejected*** Rejected***
FTSE4G Europe Rejected*** Rejected***
FTSE4G Global Rejected** Rejected***
KLD400 Not Rejected Not Rejected
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
H0: Normally distributed residuals
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A.3 Fama-French
Table A7 and Table A8 presents the output from regression model (2) and (4), respectively.
The outputs are used to construct the coefficients and annualized alphas in Table A9. To get
the contributions in Table A11, the coefficients are multiplied with the annualized Fama-
French factors in Table A10.
Table A7: Output Model (2)
Factor loadings and % monthly alphas. T-values in parentheses.
Full sample α βMarket βSize βValue R2
FTSE4G US -0.031 0.06*** -0.02 -0.08** 0.15
(-0.49) (3.48) (-0.89) (-2.44)
FTSE4G UK -0.023 -0.04*** -0.04 0.02 0.08
(-0.60) (-4.21) (-1.10) (1.27)
FTSE4G Europe 0.003 0.00 -0.11*** 0.00 0.20
(0.08 ) (-0.11) (-5.27) (-0.29)
FTSE4G Global 0.018 0.05*** -0.12 *** -0.06** 0.24
(0.37) (5.03) (-3.73) (-2.04)
KLD400 0.029 0.00 0.03 -0.04** 0.06
(0.65) (-0.24) (1.63) (-2.15)
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
All regressions use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags, where the number of lags is determined by
4(n/100)2/9 (Newey and West 1987).
Alphas and deltas (δ ) are monthly percentages.
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Table A8: Output Model (4)
Betas (β ), interaction terms (γ) and % monthly alphas (α) and deltas (δ ) from model (4).
T-values in parentheses.
Growth Combined α βMarket βSize βValue R2
FTSE4G US 0.003 0.06*** -0.08*** -0.14*** 0.28
(0.05) (2.67) (-2.99) (-3.62)
FTSE4G UK 0.029 -0.04*** -0.01 0.03* 0.14
(0.59) (-3.76) (-0.15) (1.70)
FTSE4G Europe 0.065 -0.01 -0.11*** 0.04** 0.28
(1.46) (-1.20) (-4.01) (2.18)
FTSE4G Global 0.023 0.05*** -0.13*** -0.07* 0.28
(0.38) (3.42) (-4.12) (-1.67)
KLD400 -0.004 0.02 -0.00 -0.07*** 0.14
(-0.09) (1.11) (-0.08) (-2.65)
Financial Crisis δ1 γ1 γ2 γ3 R2
FTSE4G US -0.569** -0.13*** 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.28
(-1.99) (-1.67) (4.24) (3.90)
FTSE4G UK -0.190 0.00 -0.14** 0.04 0.14
(-1.64) (0.27) (-2.09) (0.57)
FTSE4G Europe -0.288** -0.05** 0.09 0.04 0.28
(-2.44) (-2.04 ) (1.40) (0.66)
FTSE4G Global -0.166 -0.04 0.02 0.24** 0.28
(-1.04) (-1.50) (0.18) (2.48)
KLD400 -0.259 -0.13*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.14
(-1.57) (-3.47) (4.35) (4.24)
Dotcom Fall δ2 γ4 γ5 γ6 R2
FTSE4G US -0.133 -0.01 0.15*** 0.08 0.28
(-0.71) (-0.10) (3.02) (1.35)
FTSE4G UK -0.216* -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.14
(-1.76) (-0.48) (-1.57) (-0.90)
FTSE4G Europe -0.212** 0.02 -0.06 -0.06** 0.28
(-1.90) (1.30) (-1.52) (-2.06)
FTSE4G Global 0.026 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.28
(0.19) (0.56) (0.62) (0.32)
KLD400 -0.019 -0.04 0.07 0.04 0.14
(-0.13) (-1.00) (1.47) (0.93)
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
All regressions use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags, where the number of lags is determined by
4(n/100)2/9 (Newey and West 1987).
Alphas and deltas (δ ) are monthly percentages.
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Table A9: Fama-French Coefficients including Growth Combined
Factor loadings and % annualized alphas.
Alpha Market Size Value R2
Full Sample FTSE4G US -0.37 0.06*** -0.02 -0.08** 0.15
(Jan’97 - Dec’14) FTSE4G UK -0.27 -0.04*** -0.04 0.02 0.08
FTSE4G Europe 0.03 0.00 -0.11*** 0.00 0.20
FTSE4G Global 0.21 0.05*** -0.12 *** -0.06** 0.24
KLD400 0.35 0.00 0.03 -0.04** 0.06
Financial Crisis FTSE4G US -6.59** -0.07 0.31*** 0.17*** 0.28
(Nov’07-Feb’09) FTSE4G UK -1.91 -0.04*** -0.15*** 0.07 0.14
FTSE4G Europe -2.65** -0.06*** -0.02 0.08 0.28
FTSE4G Global -1.70 0.01 -0.11 0.17** 0.28
KLD400 -3.11* -0.11*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.14
Dotcom Fall FTSE4G US -1.55 0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.28
(April’00-Mar’03) FTSE4G UK -2.22* -0.05*** -0.12** 0.01 0.14
FTSE4G Europe -1.75 0.01 -0.17*** -0.02 0.28
FTSE4G Global 0.59 0.07*** -0.09 -0.06** 0.28
KLD400 -0.28 -0.02 0.07* -0.03 0.14
Growth Combined FTSE4G US 0.03 0.06*** -0.08*** -0.14*** 0.28
FTSE4G UK 0.35 -0.04*** -0.01 0.03* 0.14
FTSE4G Europe 0.78 -0.01 -0.11*** 0.04** 0.28
FTSE4G Global 0.28 0.05*** -0.13*** -0.07* 0.28
KLD400 -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.07*** 0.14
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
All regressions use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags, where the number of lags is determined by 4(n/100)2/9 (Newey
and West 1987).
The coefficients for the Full sample period are estimated using model (2). See Table A7 for the regression output.
The coefficients for the Financial Crisis and the Dotcom Fall are from model (4). See Table A8 for the regression output
Alphas for Financial Crisis and (DotcomFall) = αGrowthCombined +δ1(2) and then annualized.
Betas for Financial Crisis and (Dotcom Fall) = Coefficients for Growth Combined + γ1/2/3/(4/5/6).
All (α+δ ) and (β + γ) are tested for joint significance.
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Table A10: Annualized Fama-French factors
Market Size Value
Full sample US 7.00 % 2.98 % 2.90 %
(Jan’97 - Dec’14) Europe 6.45 % 0.48 % 5.74 %
Global 5.88 % 0.27 % 4.83 %
Tech Bubble US 21.99 % -0.39 % -10.25 %
(Jan’97 - Mar’00) Europe 15.54 % -2.98 % -5.29 %
Global 15.90 % -4.98 % -8.19 %
Dotcom Fall US -18.19 % 5.60 % 23.72 %
(April’00 - Mar’03) Europe -18.60 % -0.59 % 39.01 %
Global -18.94 % 1.34 % 33.27 %
Growth US 14.30 % 3.98 % 5.75 %
(April’03- Oct’07) Europe 28.77 % 4.79 % 7.98 %
Global 20.67 % 4.38 % 6.07 %
Financial Crisis US -40.67 % 2.30 % -11.09 %
(Nov’07 - Feb’09) Europe -47.69 % -5.05% -8.83 %
Global -43.24 % -2.34 % -5.05 %
Recovery US 23.30 % 2.93 % 2.08%
(Mar’09-Dec’14) Europe 17.33 % 0.98 % -0.85 %
Global 19.41 % 0.17 % 0.92 %
Growth Combined US 19.91 % 2.48 % 0.20 %
Europe 20.62 % 1.2 8% 0.94 %
Global 18.98 % 0.30 % 0.35 %
Factor returns annualized by (1+RFactor)12−1.
RFactor is monthly factor return
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Table A11: Fama-French Contributions including, Growth Combined
SRI-BM Alpha Market Size Value
Full sample FTSE4G US -0.26 -0.37 0.42*** -0.07 -0.24**
(Jan’97- Dec ’14) FTSE4G UK -0.42 -0.27 -0.23*** -0.02 0.10
FTSE4G Europe -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.02
FTSE4G Global 0.22 0.21 0.31*** -0.03*** -0.27**
KLD400 0.30 0.35 -0.02 0.08 -0.11**
Financial Crisis FTSE4G US -4.61 -6.59** 2.97 0.90*** -1.89***
(Nov’07 - Feb’09) FTSE4G UK 0.04 -1.91 1.80*** 0.77*** -0.62
FTSE4G Europe -0.49 -2.65** 2.73*** 0.12 -0.69
FTSE4G Global -2.82 -1.70 -0.50 0.26 -0.88**
KLD400 0.96 -3.11* 4.53*** 0.55*** -1.01***
Dotcom Fall FTSE4G US -3.57 -1.55 -0.95 0.38 -1.45
(April’00 - Mar’03) FTSE4G UK -0.80 -2.22* 0.98*** 0.07** 0.37
FTSE4G Europe -2.54 -1.75 -0.16 0.10*** -0.73
FTSE4G Global -2.69 0.59 -1.31*** -0.12 -1.85**
KLD400 -0.19 -0.28 0.36 0.38* -0.65
Growth Combined FTSE4G US 0.94 0.03 1.13*** -0.19*** -0.03***
FTSE4G UK -0.51 0.35 -0.88*** -0.01 0.03*
FTSE4G Europe 0.43 0.78 -0.26 -0.13*** 0.04**
FTSE4G Global 1.23 0.28 1.01*** -0.04*** -0.02*
KLD400 0.27 -0.05 0.33 0.00 -0.01***
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
All regressions use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags, where the number of lags is determined by 4(n/100)2/9 (Newey and West
1987).
The annulized alphas are retrieved from Table A9
We derive the contributions by multiplying the annualized Fama-French factor returns (Table A10) with the regression coefficients
from model (2) and (4) (Table A9). We use model (2) for the full period, while we obtain the coefficients for the Dotcom Fall and the
Financial Crisis from the expanded Fama-French model (4).
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